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Prior task experience affects
temporal prediction and estimation
Simon Tobin* and Simon Grondin
École de Psychologie, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada
It has been shown that prior experience with a task improves temporal prediction, even
when the amount of prior experience with the task is often limited. The present study
targeted the role of extensive training on temporal prediction. Expert and intermediate
runners had to predict the time of a 5 km running competition. Furthermore, after
the race’s completion, participants had to estimate their running time so that it could
be compared with the predicted time. Results show that expert runners were more
accurate than intermediate runners for both predicting and estimating their running time.
Furthermore, only expert runners had an estimation that was more accurate than their
initial prediction. The results confirm the role of prior task experience in both temporal
prediction and estimation.
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Introduction
Time perception, as opposed to other sensory modalities, does not rely on sensory receptors. As
a consequence, researchers trying to explain time perception quickly turned into the direction of
cognitive processes such as attention and memory (Roeckelein, 2008). While the role of attention
in timing as been thoroughly discussed (see Brown, 2008, for a review), some aspects of the
involvement of memory, especially long-term memory (LTM), are still understudied, as pointed
out recently by many authors (Rattat and Droit-Volet, 2005b; Taatgen and van Rijn, 2011; Tobin
and Grondin, 2012). Nonetheless, it should be noted that some aspects of LTM were studied in a
timing research perspective, such as the lifespan of time intervals inmemory (Gamache andGrondin,
2010), the interference between different temporal traces (Grondin, 2005) or between other task
demands and memory traces (Ogden et al., 2008), the development of temporal memory (Rattat
and Droit-Volet, 2005a,b, 2007), the effect of the number of presentations of a standard duration on
temporal discrimination (Jones and Wearden, 2003; Grondin and McAuley, 2009; Grondin, 2012),
the influence of pharmacological substances on temporal memory (Meck, 1983), and the EEG basis
of memory traces (Ng et al., 2011).
Even if the involvement of LTM in timing did receive some attention lately, the actual corpus of
knowledge in the literature is still thinner than one may wish. One particular overlooked aspect of
LTM that has been recently brought up by Tobin and Grondin (2012) is the effect of prior experience
with a task on the perceived duration of that task. Indeed, as many daily activities (for instance,
driving to work) occurs routinely, it is very likely that one learns temporal information about
recurring tasks, temporal information that in turn can improve temporal estimation. As a matter of
fact, children as young as 4 years old can classify orderly activities like eating a cookie and watching
a movie on the basis of their duration. This shows that children already have a representation of how
long some tasks may last (Friedman, 1990).
One of the reasonwhy the influence of prior experiencewith a task on timing has been overlooked
until recently might simply be because it appears too obvious (Tobin and Grondin, 2012). It is
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logical to think that one uses experience about a task when
such experience is available. Nonetheless, the influence of prior
experience on timing clearly deserves empirical investigations
for two main reasons. First, as many daily tasks happen more
than once, many temporal judgments should occur in situations
when prior experience with a task is available. Not taking prior
experience with a task into account does not seem a very
ecological way to address temporal perception, especially now
that a growing number of researchers agree that time perception
researches should turn to more ecological tasks (Tobin et al.,
2010; Bisson et al., 2012; Matthews and Meck, 2014). Secondly,
studying prior experience, as it was shown recently by Tobin and
Grondin (2012), sheds light on the involvement of LTM in timing,
an involvement that has long been overshadowed by the more
prominent and studied role of attention.
Prior Experience with a Task
The effect of prior experience with a task on timing may be
explained by two main cognitive processes. First, as the task is
repeated, its execution becomes automatized and requires less
attention to perform, leaving more attentional resources for time
monitoring. Since the amount of attention available for timing
is strongly related to the accuracy of temporal judgments, it
explains why the durations of trained tasks are more accurate
than novel ones. This demonstration has been reported numerous
times in the literature (see Block et al., 2010). The second aspect
that could explain the effect of prior experience regards LTM.
Indeed, through numerous repetitions of the task, one gains
certain knowledge of how long the task lasts.
A recent study by Tobin and Grondin (2012) targeted the
involvement of LTM by measuring how different levels of task
duration knowledge affect temporal perception. They defined
“task duration knowledge” as LTM stored knowledge about
the duration of a task. Their study showed that task duration
knowledge can improve temporal performance across different
temporal tasks (verbal estimation and production) and duration
range (from 30 to 90 s). Furthermore, this result was obtained
by two distinct manipulations, both requiring the participation
of elite athletes (swimmers). First, they compared the temporal
perception of two automatized tasks, i.e., tasks with higher task
duration knowledge than the other. Secondly, they altered the
context in which a single task was performed in order to control
the usage of task duration knowledge. In both cases, having more
task duration knowledge, or performing the task in a context
that allowed relying on task duration knowledge, enhanced the
temporal judgments’ precision. In addition, they also performed a
third experiment in which elite swimmers were asked to produce
36 s of visualization of a well known task (swimming) and another
unknown task (climbingMount Everest). This experiment further
showed that the physical execution is not required to observe an
effect of prior experience with a task as the temporal productions
of the swimming task (familiar) weremuchmore precise than that
of the climbing one (unfamiliar).
While the task was not physically executed in this last
experiment, it was still visualized. If no execution at all (whether
physically or mentally) is performed, can prior experience with a
task still enhance temporal perception? In other words, do elite
athletes like those who participated in Tobin and Grondin (2012)
simply know how long it takes them to cover certain distances?
The best way to answer that question is to require a temporal
prediction of participants with various expertise levels. Indeed,
in the prediction task, the temporal judgment is made before
the task is even executed, thus, the temporal judgment cannot
rely on any cues related to the execution of the task but only on
previous knowledge with the task at hand. Indeed, the attentional
explanation of the effect of prior experience cannot apply to the
prediction task; the temporal judgment can only rely on previously
learned knowledge stored in LTM.
Thus, the first goal of the experiment is to extend the findings of
the Tobin and Grondin (2012) study to the prediction task. In that
regards, the literature already provides certain answers. Indeed,
many experiments, although they did not use the terms task
duration knowledge, did observe the effect of prior experience
with a task on temporal prediction (Thomas et al., 2003, 2007;
Thomas and Handley, 2008; see Halkjelsvik and Jørgensen, 2012,
for a review).
For instance, Thomas et al. (2003) gave participants a little
practice time (2 min) with the task before asking them a temporal
prediction. It turned out that this simple 2min of practice strongly
increased the prediction performance. Furthermore, Roy et al.
(2008) gave participants a single practice trial and further gave a
temporal feedback about the duration of that trial for only half of
the participants. When asked to make temporal prediction in the
following trial, participants who received the temporal feedback
were more accurate, showing that they used the information
provided by the feedback to guide their next prediction. Finally,
Roy and Christenfeld (2007, Experiment 2) compared the
prediction of a task based on experience with the task. Indeed,
participants had a practice block containing one, three or nine
trials of the targeted task (origami). It turned out that the number
of trials significantly affected temporal prediction. The number of
practice trials affected the side of the error; participants with one
practice trial overestimated the time it would take and participants
with nine trials underestimated the time it would take.
The aforementioned studies suggest that prior experience
with a task increases the precision of the temporal prediction,
or changes the side of the error (from overestimation to
underestimation). However, it should be noted that, in these
experiments, the prior experience is often limited (from only a
part of the task to nine repetitions of the task). Although their
results were quite interesting, it appears necessary to study the
effect of a more extensive prior experience. Indeed, as Tobin
and Grondin (2012) pointed out in introducing the notion of
task duration knowledge, this aspect of temporal perception is
relevant for recurring tasks, tasks that are executed on a daily basis,
again and again. Thus, although the previously cited experiments
were well constructed and have a clear theoretical output, it does
not show how the temporal prediction is affected by a level of
prior experience that is comparable with other daily activities, like
driving to work each day for many years.
As a result, one legitimate question arising is the following:
what happens when one has an extensive training with the task,
such as athletes do with their sport? Does the prediction reach
an impressive accuracy level, as it is observed with temporal
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estimation (see Tobin and Grondin, 2012)? As far as we know,
the only study that required the participation of experts (pianists)
is the one reported by Boltz et al. (1998; Experiment 2). In their
experiment, they compared the time prediction across novices
and expert pianists for the execution of musical pieces varying
in their degree of familiarity (i.e., identified as recently learned,
well learned or extremely well learned). Their results show that
for both experts and novices, the degree of familiarity had a
significant effect on predicted time: the less familiar the melody
was, the longer the predicted duration was. However, experts
were surprisingly not better at predicting time than novices,
which contradicts what may be expected on the basis of other
previously cited studies (Thomas et al., 2003; Roy et al., 2008).
Indeed, as prior task experience seems to increase time prediction
accuracy, experts should have been better than novices. Two
methodological aspects of their experiment may explain this
non-significant result. First, participants were instructed to
predict to the nearest 30 s. It might have leveled the predictions
across the two groups and masked any significant difference
that was within a 30-s margin. Furthermore, in music, the key
temporal element might be the inter-note interval or tempo, not
the overall duration. Hence, it might be best to study the effect
of expertise on time prediction with a task in which the elapsed
duration is fundamental, like in sports. This idea will be tested in
the present experiment.
Temporal Estimation
Using the prediction task opens the door to studying another
relevant aspect of timing. Indeed, while a temporal prediction
on its own is interesting, it is even more useful if it is
compared with an assessment of the duration once the task
is completed. Indeed, as the prediction cannot rely on active
time monitoring, it is intriguing to assess how far the prediction
is from the temporal estimation of the same task upon
completion. Few studies compared directly temporal prediction
and the subsequent estimation of the task once completed.
Some studies did offer that comparison (Roy and Christenfeld,
2008), but used the retrospective paradigm. Such a paradigm
means that participants were not told before the start of the
duration to be timed that time estimation would be required.
Hence, in a retrospective timing task, participants learn the
time estimation requirement afterward. Though retrospective
estimates are valuable measures of timing and deserve more
empirical investigation (see Tobin et al., 2010; Bisson et al.,
2012), it would probably be more relevant, when comparing
temporal prediction and estimation, to use the prospective
paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are told in advance that
a temporal judgment will be required after completing the task.
Hence participants can allow more attentional resources to time
monitoring, explaining why time estimates in the prospective
paradigm are most often reported as more precise than time
estimates in retrospective conditions (Block and Zakay, 1997;
Block et al., 2010). By using the prospective paradigm, this
experiment should answer the following question: if one puts all
its attentional resources into timing its running performance, can
its estimation be more precise than the initial prediction or there
is no gain to be expected?
The few studies left that compared time estimation
(prospectively) and prediction do not allow for a clear picture
of how these two judgment types differ. First, the Boltz et al.’s
(1998) experiment showed that, for expert pianists, the estimated
duration was more accurate than the predicted duration.
However, the difference between temporal estimation and
prediction of novices was mediated by the familiarity with the
melody. Indeed, the estimations were more accurate than the
predictions for only two of the three familiarity levels (novel
and well trained). This improvement was not recorded for the
extremely well trained melodies.
On the opposite, Burt and Kemp (1994) found large differences
when comparing the prediction and estimation of daily activities
(like buying stamps or sorting cards). Indeed, the temporal
estimation accuracy after the task’s completion was steeply
increased when compared to the actual prediction. Hence, the
difference between temporal prediction and estimation appears
unclear so far and might be mediated by the level of familiarity
or prior experience with the task, as suggested by the results of
Boltz et al. (1998).
The Present Study
For the experiment’s purpose, expert and intermediate runners
were recruited and had to predict how long it would take them to
run a 5 km race. Participants were also required to estimate their
completion time immediately after the finish line.
Since prior task experience seems to improve temporal
judgments, it was expected the more experienced runners to have
the best temporal prediction and estimation. Furthermore, we
expected the temporal estimation to be more accurate than the
initial time prediction as the estimation, being made once the task
is completed, could be based on more information (i.e., on how
the participants felt, its rank, the fatigue level, etc.).
A third explanatory goal was to assess if all sorts of temporal
knowledge are equal. Indeed, runners probably build the task
duration knowledge from the feedback they get after each training
session (e.g., this session took 43 min). Thus, participants had to
report what the sort of feedback they were using (1- measure of
time, 2- measure of distance, 3- measure of speed), when training,
to see if one sort of feedback provides a better knowledge of
one’s running time that can translate into more accurate temporal
prediction and estimation. We expected that using feedback
about speed would be the most efficient feedback type (highest
correlations with temporal precision) because one’s running speed
can be applied to other (i.e., shorter or longer) running situations
(e.g., if one knows s/he runs at 10 km/hr, s/he can expect to run
15 km in 90 min).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Ninety-one participants (50 males and 41 females) out of the 244
that were registered in a running competition enrolled in the
experiment. Six participants were rejected as they did not fill the
form properly or did not complete the event, leaving a total of 85
participants. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 66, with a
median of 28 years old.
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Material
The participants had to fill out an in-house questionnaire
assessing their sporting level, training habits and knowledge of
time while running. The questionnaire was in paper form. Three
questions measure training habits and were: How often do you
get measures of (1) time (2) distance (3) speed when you train?
The response scale extended from 1 to 5; 1 = never, 5 = always.
They were also asked (on a 1–5 scale, 5 = very well) how well
they know the time it takes them to run a specific distance (5 km).
The other questions were “You have been participating in running
race for how many years?”, “How many times per week do you
run?”, “How many hours and minutes per week do you run?”,
“What is your running level (amateur, provincial or national)?”,
“How many times have you participated in this specific race?”
“How far from your real performance would a satisfactory
prediction be?”. The runners supplied their own clothing and
accessories.
Procedure
The participants first had to register for the race. The event was
a local, on-campus, 5-km race open to the public, although it
was also part of a provincial competitive schedule. The circuit
consisted of two 2.5-km laps without any distance markers. The
circuit changes every year and is unannounced, which means that
runners cannot train for this specific race. The goal of the race
was to finish not only in the fastest possible time, but in the most
accurately predicted time (awards were also given for the best
predictions). However, running as fast as possible is still the main
goal of the race; the prediction process is simply added for fun.
Hence, runners were not simply self-pacing to achieve a good
prediction; they ran as fast as they could and hoped they predicted
a precise duration. Watches or any other timing devices were
prohibited. Each runner stated their predicted time when they
registered for the race (and these predictions were later retrieved
by the experimenters). After registration, participantswere invited
to enroll in the experiment. If they accepted, they had to fill out
the questionnaire and return it before the start of the race. One of
the questions was aimed at defining groups for statistical analyses.
Thus, they had to report the level at which they compete: national,
provincial, and amateur.
The race proceeded without any intervention on the part of the
experimenters. They waited for the runners to pass the finish line
before collecting the final running time estimates. The runners
knew before the start of the race that this time estimation would
be required. The runners took from 924 to 1918 s to complete the
race, with a mean time of 1348 s (22 min and 28 s). It should
be noted that the weather (early spring in a Northern climate)
was particularly difficult with an outside temperature around 4° C
wind heavy rain1 and gusty winds. This study was approved by
the Comité d’éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de
l’Université Laval, withwritten informed consent from all subjects.
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
1According to verbal reports of many participants, the climate conditions
slowed the overall running performance. However, they did report taking the
weather into account when registering the temporal prediction.
Data Analysis
For the purpose of comparing the effect of expertise, two
groups were created: experts and intermediates. The expert group
consisted of runners who compete regularly at a provincial and
national level (n = 30). The intermediate group consisted of
runners who only compete in amateur events (n = 55). This
group allocation was based on self-reported information. Hence,
in order to investigate if both groups differed in terms of running
experience, the amount of training was compared. Expert runners
trained in average 4.81 times a week for a total of 6.86 h per
week, while these numbers are 3.14 and 2.82, respectively, for
intermediate runners. The groups differ significantly for both the
number of training sessions per week, t(83) = 5.588, p < 0.001,
and the number of training hours per week, t(83) = 8.047,
p < 0.001. Furthermore, expert runners reported they have been
participating in running races for an average of 8.06 years, while
this number goes down to 2.66 for novices. This difference is
significant t(43.87)=  3.604, p< 0.001.
Finally, participants were asked to report how well they know
the time it takes them to run a specific distance (like 5 km). Expert
runners significantly reported a better knowledge (M = 4.14)
than intermediate runners (M = 3.25), with scores on a 1–5
scale (5 = very high). This difference is statistically significant,
t(78) = 5.106, p < 0.001. Hence, the distinction between both
groups appears adequate since they significantly differ on many
aspects2.
Two dependent variables were used for assessing performances.
The first was the perceived to real time ratio (Ratio), a variable
showing the side of the error (over- or underestimation). A Ratio
of 1 means a perfect estimation, while Ratios under and over 1
mean time underestimation and overestimation, respectively. The
second variable used was the absolute standardized error (ASE), a
measure that is not sensitive to the side of the error, thus a more
genuine measure of accuracy. The ASE is calculated on the ratio
by taking |1-ratio|.
Results
Table 1 shows the Ratio and ASE for the two time judgments
(prediction and estimation), by expertise (experts vs.
intermediates). To compare these judgments and assess if
the expertise produced an effect of these judgments, a 2  2
factorial design ANOVA was first conducted on the Ratio, with
time judgment being a repeated-measure factor and expertise
a between-subject factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant
expertise effect, F(1,69) = 7.67, p = 0.007, !2 = 0.100 and a
significant interaction between time judgment and expertise,
F(1,66) = 4.55, p = 0.036, !2 = 0.062. A breakdown of the
interaction revealed that expert runners were closer to 1 than
intermediate for both temporal judgments. Furthermore, for
the expert runners, the estimated time was more precise than
the predicted time, while there was no difference between these
2The experts reported here may not represent “real” experts by some as they
are not elite international level. However, the significant differences between
the two groups reported here are strong enough to represent two distinct
groups having a distinct background with running. It is not a study aimed at
extraordinary elite experts.
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TABLE 1 | Mean (M) Ratio and ASE as a function of the task and
expertise level.
Expertise level Task Ratio ASE
M SD M SD
Intermediates Prediction 1.039 0.08 0.052 0.05
Estimation 1.027 0.05 0.043 0.04
Experts Prediction 0.988 0.02 0.018 0.02
Estimation 1.004 0.01 0.012 0.01
SD, standard deviation.
two temporal judgments for the intermediate runners. The
same ANOVA design was used and conducted on the ASE. This
time, only the effect of expertise is significant F(1,69) = 13.371,
p 0.001, !2 = 0.109, showing that experts are more accurate for
both tasks.
Since the previous analyses are based on self reported
group attribution, the relation between expertise and temporal
performance was further analyzed with correlational analyses.
Indeed, correlations between the number of training per week
and perceived time were calculated. They show that the more
weekly training sessions a runner complete, the more precise
the temporal judgments are, and this finding applies to both
prediction (R =  0.575, p  0.001 for the ASE and R =  0.403,
p  0.001 for the Ratio) and estimation (R =  0.498, p  0.001
for the ASE and R =  0.248, p= 0.036 for the Ratio).
Furthermore, runners were asked to report the frequency
to which they use measures of distance, time, and speed.
Correlational analyses were conducted to assess if the use of a
specific feedback was associated with temporal accuracy (again
using the percentage of error). The analyses revealed that the use
of speed was the only feedback type that correlated significantly
with time prediction (R =  0.285, p = 0.019 for the ASE and
R =  0.239, p = 0.033). Thus, the more runners reported
using measures of running speed while training (regardless of
their expertise levels), the more precise was their predicted
time. A mediation analysis revealed that the use of speed-related
feedbacks did not mediate the effect of expertise. Although
correlated to predicted time, the usage of feedback was not
correlated to estimated time.
Discussion
This section will first discuss about the effect of extensive
training on temporal performance and secondly, will contrast the
prediction and the subsequent estimation.
Effect of Experience
The results show that expert runners are better at predicting
their running time than intermediate runners. This conclusion
is coherent with other studies showing prior task experience
enhances the prediction accuracy (Boltz et al., 1998). While
there is sufficient body of studies showing this role of prior
task experience on temporal prediction, the demonstrations were
usually made with very limited prior task experience or training
with the task. Hence, the participation of experienced runners
allowed assessing how extensive training affects the accuracy of
the prediction.
Both groups of runners exhibited surprisingly unbiased
predictions. Indeed, compared to other studies using temporal
prediction (see 1 in Roy et al., 2005), the ratios recorded here are
quite close to 1.Hence, it suggests that themore one is experienced
with a task, the better the prediction becomes. That is coherent
with Tobin and Grondin’s (2012) study in which experimented
athletes reached an accuracy level on a temporal estimation task
much better than what is generally observed in the literature
for similar tasks/durations. Consequently, both studies converge
and show that temporal perception processes (estimation or
prediction) are strongly affected by prior task experience and that
a “near-perfect” ratio is possible with sufficient training with the
temporal task.
Another aspect of the results is interesting. Indeed, not
only were the expert runners more accurate, the side of
their error (over- or underestimation) was the opposite than
the one observed with intermediate runners. Indeed, expert
runners predicted a faster performance than what they actually
accomplished while intermediate runners underestimated their
performance by predicting a slower time. The amount of prior
task experience not only affected temporal precision, but also
caused a directional effect. This directional effect may be caused
by one’s confidence into personal abilities, with experts being
more confident than intermediates.
While these results show that experts are better at perceiving
time, little is known as to why exactly they are better. Tobin
et al. (2010) studied the time perception of gamers for 12 and
35 min of gaming. In their studies, gamers reported playing an
amount of 12.95 h per week on average. This amount of game
play exceeds by far the amount of training reported here by the
runners. However, gamers were quite imprecise at estimating
time, with ratios ranging from 1.2 to 1.6 depending on the
duration used. Thus, it appears that doing a specific task often,
be it running or playing video games, is not sufficient to create
temporal expertise. The main difference between these two tasks
can be the importance of time. Indeed, when playing, the duration
of the game is not important. In fact, many players reported
they specifically play to lose track of time (Wood et al., 2007).
However, when training, runners may pay close attention to their
distance, time and speed. Hence, for the large experience with
the task to translate into more accurate temporal perception, it
might be necessary to pay attention to the duration of each activity
(i.e., each training session) and get timely feedback (e.g., this 5-
km training took 21 min). Without these feedbacks, temporal
expertise may not develop, like in the case of gamers. Indeed, it
is well known that temporal feedback improves time perception
(Fraisse, 1971; Hicks and Miller, 1976; Ryan and Fritz, 2007).
This explication is also coherent with the memory bias account
proposed by Roy et al. (2005). Indeed, they suggested that the
inaccuracy in the temporal prediction could be caused by an
inaccuracy in the memory of the previous occurrence of the
task. Said differently, people have poor prediction because they
remembered poorly the duration it took the previous times. Thus,
receiving timely feedback may often help creating an accurate
memory of how long the task last, which in turn translates into
accurate predictions. In line with this idea, runners had to report
what kind of feedbacks, if any, they use while training (elapsed
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duration, traveled distance, or averaged speed) to see if the use of
these feedbacks correlates with temporal performance.
The results show that, among time, speed and distance, it is only
the usage of speed-related feedback that is significantly correlated
with the accuracy of time prediction, regardless of the expertise
level. Hence, the more a runner uses a measure of speed when
training, themore precise at predicting time he/she becomes. This
finding suggests that runners could gain their temporal expertise
through the feedback they got after each training session (in fact,
many GPS systems nowadays seem to have this in mind, helping
runners know their running pace when training). Indeed, by
learning their average speed, it becomes easier for them to know
how long running a specific distance should take by using a simple
formula based on their average speed.
Prediction vs. Estimation
The secondmain goal of the experiment was to contrast the initial
temporal prediction with the estimation upon completion. As
stated in the introduction, few studies compared the performance
level on a temporal prediction with its subsequent temporal
estimation. Furthermore, the conclusions from such studies
differed, offering quite a complex picture. Based on our results,
both the accuracy of the initial prediction and the expertise level
of the participant might explain the difference between prediction
and estimation and further explain why different studies reached
different conclusions.
First, for novel or occasional tasks such as the one used by
Burt and Kemp (1994), the recorded predictions were far from
accurate. Hence, once the task is completed, participants may
easily figure that their prediction was wrong and adjust it with
a more precise estimation. This could explain why in such cases
the estimation is more accurate than the prediction. Indeed, the
farther the prediction is from the actual duration, the larger are the
chances to improve the subsequent temporal estimation as there
is much more room for improvement.
However, when the prediction accuracy is closer to the target
duration, it may take a certain level of expertise to be able to adjust
that prediction and make a more precise estimation. Indeed, our
intermediate runners did not improve their prediction accuracy
when estimating time after completion. Similarly, novice pianists
in the Boltz et al.’s (1998) experiment only improved in the 2°
of familiarly (novel and well trained) for which their predicted
time was the less accurate (however, for the extremely well trained
melody, the prediction of novices was more accurate and their
estimation did not improve that prediction). On the opposite, our
expert runners and Boltz et al.’s (1998) expert pianists were always
better at estimating than predicting time, even if they were better
than novices at predicting time. Hence, it may require a certain
level of expertise with the task in order to “read” the duration of
the task and correct the prediction into a more precise temporal
estimation. Thus not only prior task experience or expertise would
predict the accuracy of the prediction, but it would also predict
one’s ability to make a temporal estimation that is more accurate
than its initial prediction.
Limitations and Future Studies
Relying on athletes allowed testing an amount of training that
is almost impossible to recreate in a laboratory setting. As the
insufficient amount of training in other studies to fully reflect
“real-life” situations was an important issue, the participation of
athletes was a sound choice. However, the clear drawback from
this decision is that participant came to the study with their own
background; it was thus impossible to monitor their training.
Since we advocate formore ecological studies in timing (see Tobin
et al., 2010), especially when studying prior task experience, we
argue that this limitation is minor. However, subsequent studies
with more experimental control on the training process will be
necessary to better understand how prior experience improves
timing. Especially, monitoring the training process could be very
informative andmight show the learning curve (for instance, what
amount of training is required to reach an asymptotic temporal
performance?).
It could be argued that another limitation of the present study is
the fact that the groupswere separated on the basis of self-reported
data (expert or intermediate). However, the statistical analysis
made on the amount of training actually showed both groups
do differ significantly. Furthermore, correlation analyses showed
that the more runners train, the more accurate their temporal
perception is. This key finding is independent from the group
attribution.
Conclusion
This study adds to the large body of evidence showing that
prior task experience enhances temporal prediction accuracy.
Furthermore, the participation of athletes showed that with more
experience with a task, predictions get more accurate. It further
shows that extensive training improves temporal performance up
to an impressive level. This finding also applies to the temporal
estimationmade after the task’s completion. Finally, the difference
between the prediction and the estimation of a task may depend
on both the accuracy of the prediction, and the level of experience
with a task.
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